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STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT
Runaway Jury: An Analysis of States Laws Concerning Juror Impeachment
Abstract
The no impeachment rule bars the admission into evidence of juror testimony regarding jury
deliberations in proceedings questioning the validity of a verdict. In Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court created a constitutional exception to the no
impeachment rule to allow impeachment of a verdict by a juror’s testimony regarding a fellow
juror’s clear statement during jury deliberations indicating reliance on racial bias as a substantial
motivating factor for that juror’s vote. This study traces the history of the no impeachment rule,
analyzes the Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), examines variation in
exceptions provided by states’ statutory no impeachment rules, and discusses the likely impact of
Pena-Rodriguez as well as policy implications of the current state of no impeachment statutes.

Keywords: no impeachment rule, Sixth Amendment, impartial jury, racial bias, rules of
evidence, jury decision-making
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Runaway Jury: An Analysis of States Laws Concerning Juror Impeachment
The no impeachment rule bars the admission into evidence, in proceedings questioning
the validity of a verdict, of post-verdict juror testimony regarding jury deliberations (Covington,
2018; Koffler, 2018).1 This long-standing rule is based on public policy considerations of
preserving the finality of verdicts, promoting uninhibited discussion during jury deliberations,
and preventing harassment of jurors by the losing party after the trial is over (Casey, 1998;
Diehm, 1991; Reidy, 2009; Thompson, 1984; West, 2011). Furthermore, the no impeachment
rule has long been thought to be vital to the survival of our system of trial by jury, as close
scrutiny of jurors’ imperfections in carrying out their duties would likely undermine a vast
number of verdicts and compromise public confidence in the jury system (Tanner v. United
States, 1987; West, 2011). Although the rule certainly serves important public policy
considerations, the rule is not without controversy, as it has prevented courts from hearing postverdict juror testimony regarding outrageous acts of jury misconduct such as use of games of
chance to determine a verdict (Vaise v. Delaval,1785, as cited in Miller, 2009) and jurors’ drug
and alcohol use during trial (Tanner v. United States,1987; West, 2011).
While its origins can be traced back to the common law in England, the no impeachment
rule has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and state statute counterparts (Crump,
2018; Miller, 2009, 2012; West, 2011). Such statutes provide for certain statutory exceptions,
such as the exceptions provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) for juror testimony regarding
outside influence, use of prejudicial extraneous evidence, and clerical mistake in entry of the
verdict on the verdict form (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009). Generally, most no impeachment
statutes draw a strong internal versus external distinction, barring jurors from impeaching their
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verdict with juror testimony regarding matters internal to jury deliberations while allowing jurors
to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters external to jury deliberations (Miller, 2009).
When the no impeachment rule bars post-verdict juror testimony regarding a fellow
juror’s remarks during jury deliberations which indicated reliance on racial stereotypes in casting
a vote of guilt, the no impeachment rule collides with the protection of a fundamental right: the
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury (Koffler, 2018). The constitutional right to
trial by an impartial jury provides essential protection for the liberty of the accused by placing
the responsibility for judging guilt or innocence in the hands of peers, as a check against the
power of the government (Crump, 2018). But this essential protection becomes an illusion when
the fate of the accused is placed in the hands of a bigoted juror and the courts turn a deaf ear to
other jurors’ reports that the jury was far from impartial.
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court created a constitutional
exception to the long-standing no impeachment rule to allow impeachment of a verdict by a
juror’s post-verdict testimony regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement during jury deliberations
indicating reliance on racial bias as a substantial motivating factor for that juror’s vote. The
Court deemed existing safeguards, such as voir dire and pre-verdict juror testimony, inadequate
to prevent racial bias, which is essential to preserving the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an
impartial jury (Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 2017).
While this recent decision represents a step in the right direction, it raises the question of
whether legislative bodies ought to re-examine state no impeachment statutes to ensure those
statutes provide for appropriate exceptions which can facilitate redress for criminal defendants
whose fate has been decided by jurors who have failed to live up to the noble ideal of the jury
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trial as a bulwark against the government’s potential abuse of power. In the wake of PenaRodriguez, it is important for state legislatures to take action since high profile instances of
verdicts infected by explicit bias undermine public confidence in our jury trial system and any
extension by the courts of the logic of this constitutional exception to verdicts influenced by
other forms of odious bias, such as bias based on sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or
gender, may occur only after a long, uneven process due to the nature of case law development.
Recent news coverage of Keith Tharpe’s death penalty appeal centering on a juror’s post-trial
statements opining regarding the “types of black people” and questioning whether “black people
even have souls” (Claiborne, 2017; Stern, 2018) and Charles Rhines’ death penalty appeal
raising the issue of jurors’ discussion of sexual orientation as a factor weighing against a life
sentence during deliberations (Chammah, 2018) illustrate the corrosive effect that verdicts
informed by jurors’ explicit biases can have on the legitimacy of the jury trial system.
Furthermore, when verdicts are products of juror misconduct, such as juror inebriation during
deliberations (Wilson, 2004) or deciding a verdict by coin toss (“Guilty with the Toss of a Coin,”
2000), and there is no redress for such injustice, this makes a mockery of the right to a fair trial.
State legislatures can play an important role in protecting this right by taking the opportunity in
the wake of Pena-Rodriguez to reassess state no impeachment statutes’ exceptions and amend
them as necessary to promote verdicts consistent with principles of justice.
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court indicated that there is notable variation
in state no impeachment statutes. In light of the Court’s creation of a constitutional exception to
statutory no impeachment rules, now is an apt occasion to examine state-to-state variation in
statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule. The present study traces the history of the no
impeachment rule, analyzes the Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017),
4
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examines state variation in exceptions to the no impeachment rule, and discusses the likely
impact of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) as well as policy implications of the current state
of states’ no impeachment statutes.
History of the No Impeachment Rule
The no impeachment rule has origins in the common law of late eighteenth century
England (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009; West, 2011). In Vaise v. Delaval (1785), based on the
rationale that a witness testifying to his own misdeeds is an intrinsically unreliable witness, Lord
Mansfield refused to accept a juror’s post-verdict affidavit stating that the jurors decided the case
by a coin toss (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009; Thompson, 1984; West, 2011). Lord Mansfield
noted, however, that post-verdict testimony regarding such jury misconduct from a source other
than jurors, such as an onlooker, would be admissible in evidence (Vaise v. Delaval, 1785, as
cited in Miller, 2009). This gave rise to the Mansfield rule, which is a blanket prohibition of
post-verdict juror testimony used to call into question the validity of the verdict (Miller, 2009;
West, 2011).
The Mansfield rule enjoyed widespread acceptance in England and was initially followed
by many courts in the United States, but over time variation among the states developed as some
states deviated from the Mansfield rule’s blanket prohibition (Miller, 2009). The Iowa rule,
established by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph
Company (1866), permitted the introduction into evidence of post-verdict juror testimony
regarding overt acts (such as the use of improper methods to arrive at a verdict – e.g., calculating
a civil damages award by averaging jurors’ individual assessments of damages or using a game
of chance to determine a verdict) for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, but did not allow such
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testimony regarding jurors’ subjective thought processes (Miller, 2009; West, 2011).The Iowa
rule thus permits verdict impeachment by juror testimony regarding matters which are not part of
the verdict itself and can be refuted by other jurors (Covington, 2018). In Massachusetts, the
jury room door was deemed the crucial dividing line, as juror testimony regarding juror
statements made outside the jury room were allowed for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, but
juror testimony regarding juror statements made inside the sacrosanct jury room were prohibited
(West, 2011; Woodward v. Leavitt, 1871).
The U.S. Supreme Court first weighed in on the no impeachment rule when, in dicta, the
Court cautioned against blind adherence to the Mansfield rule, noting that there may be cases
where prohibiting the admission into evidence of post-verdict juror testimony would violate the
fundamental principles of justice (United States v. Reid, 1851; Miller, 2009; West, 2011). Then,
in Mattox v. United States (1892), the Court held that post-verdict juror testimony regarding
external influences, such as extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside influence, is
admissible in evidence to impeach a verdict (Mattox v. United States, 1892; Miller, 2009; West,
2011). In McDonald v. Pless (1915), the Court reiterated that some cases may require a court to
allow verdict impeachment by post-verdict juror testimony in order to avoid violating the
fundamental principles of justice, but found that a jury’s calculation of a civil damages award by
averaging each juror’s assessment of damages did not warrant deviation from the general rule
prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict. Thus, the Court rejected the Iowa
rule, embracing instead the Mansfield rule albeit with an exception for external influences and a
cautionary note that justice may require deviation from the general prohibition in certain cases
(Covington, 2018; Miller, 2009).
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In 1975, the no impeachment rule was codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which prohibits use of post-verdict juror testimony to impeach a verdict, with the exception of
juror testimony regarding outside influence or use of prejudicial extraneous evidence (Crump,
2018). Note that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not apply to nonjuror testimony, nor to
juror testimony if offered either prior to the verdict or for a purpose other than impeaching the
verdict, even if it is post-verdict testimony (Miller, 2012). The legislative history of Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) shows that Congress explicitly considered a formulation similar to the
Iowa rule, which would have allowed, for purposes of verdict impeachment, juror testimony
regarding objective incidents transpiring during jury deliberations but not subjective mental
processes, but decided instead to adopt a rule which permits juror testimony as to external
matters but not as to matters internal to jury deliberations due to concerns regarding the need to
preserve finality of verdicts and prevent harassment of jurors (Miller, 2009, 2012; West, 2011).
Most states have evidentiary rules similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally
prohibit the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict with the exception of juror testimony
regarding outside influence or use of prejudicial extraneous evidence (Miller, 2009, 2012).
In Tanner v. United States (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling
that post-verdict juror testimony regarding jurors’ use of alcohol and illegal drugs during the trial
was inadmissible to impeach the verdict in support of a motion for new trial under Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b). The Court reasoned that the substance abuse, regardless of whether it
occurred outside the jury room, was not an outside influence (Tanner v. United States, 1987).
The Court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)’s external versus internal distinction rests
not on the location where the incident arose, but rather on whether or not the incident was
internal to jury deliberations (Tanner v. United States, 1987). The Court also held that Federal
7
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Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by a competent jury
because the evidentiary rule furthers important public policy considerations and the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by a competent jury is protected by other safeguards such as voir dire,
the ability of jurors to report their fellow jurors’ misconduct before a verdict is rendered, and the
admissibility of non-jurors’ post-verdict testimony regarding their observations of jurors’
behavior (Tanner v. United States,1987).
To resolve a circuit split, in 2006 Congress amended Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) by
adding an additional exception allowing juror testimony regarding a jury’s clerical mistake in
entry of the verdict on the verdict form (Miller, 2009).2 In doing so, Congress rejected the
approach of creating a broader exception allowing juror testimony regarding the verdict resulting
from juror misunderstanding of jury instructions or the verdict’s consequences because such
errors involve subjective mental processes (Miller, 2009, 2012). Rather, this third exception
only allows for juror testimony regarding whether the verdict entered on the verdict form
accurately reflects the verdict rendered by the jury (Miller, 2009, 2012).
In the wake of Tanner v. United States (1987), courts have generally adhered to the
Tanner interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)’s internal versus external distinction,
generally not allowing jurors to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters internal to jury
deliberations while allowing jurors to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters external
to jury deliberations (Miller, 2009). In Warger v. Shauers (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the no impeachment rule’s application to bar post-verdict juror testimony
regarding a fellow juror’s statements during jury deliberations which indicate that juror’s bias in
favor of one party to a civil lawsuit based on the juror’s life experiences. The Court held that
such bias is not extraneous prejudicial information because the life experiences jurors bring with
8
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them into the jury room are considered matters internal to jury deliberations and the fact that the
juror would not have been seated on the jury had the juror been truthful during voir dire about
these life experiences does not render the juror’s statements about those life experiences
extraneous. The Court further held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not infringe the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when applied to bar post-verdict juror
testimony regarding a fellow juror’s statements during jury deliberation revealing that juror’s
bias in favor of one party based on life experiences, about which the juror lied during voir dire,
because, even if voir dire is not an effective safeguard of the right to an impartial jury in such a
case, the other Tanner safeguards, such as the ability to offer pre-verdict juror testimony
regarding bias and evidence of bias from non-juror sources, still offer protection of the right to
an impartial jury. While the Court did not create a constitutional exception to the no
impeachment rule in Warger, the Court noted in dicta that its calculus of whether the Tanner
safeguards are sufficient may differ if presented with a case of extreme juror bias which
intrinsically violates the right to trial by an impartial jury (Covington, 2018; Warger v.
Shauers,2014).
The courts have struggled with the application of the no impeachment rule to juror
testimony regarding racial bias during jury deliberations, resulting in a circuit split (Covington,
2018; Koffler, 2018). Some appellate courts have extended Tanner’s logic to hold that statutory
no impeachment rules’ prohibition of juror testimony regarding jurors’ racially biased statements
during jury deliberations when offered for the purpose of impeaching a verdict does not violate
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury (Miller, 2009; see, e.g., United States v.
Benally,10th Cir. 2008). Other appellate courts, however, have found the Tanner safeguards
offer insufficient protection in cases involving racial bias in jury deliberations and therefore the
9
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no impeachment rule must not be applied inflexibly where it would deny due process or the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury; instead, trial courts have discretion to admit into
evidence, for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, juror testimony regarding jurors’ racially
biased statements during jury deliberations (United States v. Villar, 1st Cir. 2009).
Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the no impeachment rule,
many have questioned its compatibility with the constitutional rights of the accused, particularly
when applied to bar juror testimony regarding jurors’ racial bias (Miller, 2009; Wolin, 2012).
Scholars have argued for courts to find ways to creatively interpret statutory no impeachment
rules to allow jurors to testify regarding jurors’ racial bias for the purpose of impeaching a
verdict (Gold, 1993; Wolin, 2012) and have pointed out that empirical evidence does not support
the Court’s conclusion in Tanner that other available safeguards sufficiently protect important
constitutional rights (Helman, 2010; West, 2011). With the Courts of Appeals reaching differing
conclusions on the application of the no impeachment rule to juror testimony regarding jurors’
racially biased statements during jury deliberations and scholars decrying the injustice which
arises when courts remain willfully ignorant of racial bias infecting jury deliberations, the time
was ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on whether the no impeachment rule must yield
to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when a juror’s statements
during jury deliberations indicate the juror relied on ethnic or racial stereotypes in casting a vote
of guilty.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017)
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the
issue of whether there is a constitutionally mandated exception to the no impeachment rule when
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a juror’s statement reveals racial bias significantly motivated his vote of guilty. In this criminal
case, after the trial concluded two jurors told defense counsel that another juror made statements
indicating that juror’s reliance on a racial stereotype characterizing Hispanic males as aggressive
towards females as the basis for voting defendant was guilty of harassment and unlawful sexual
contact and encouraging other jurors to also vote guilty based on this racial stereotype.
Defendant requested a new trial based on this disclosure of racial bias in jury deliberations, but
the state trial court refused to grant a new trial due to Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b), which
prohibits juror testimony regarding statements made during jury deliberations in a proceeding
concerning the validity of the verdict. The intermediate state appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling and the state supreme court also affirmed.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote the
majority opinion. Citing the United States’ history of racial discrimination in the jury system
and efforts by both the legislature and the courts to overcome that history and ensure that juries
act to safeguard the accused from wrongful state action, the Court concluded that racial bias is
different from the types of misconduct and juror bias considered insufficient to warrant an
exception to the no impeachment rule in the Court’s precedents.3 While such previously
considered misconduct and juror bias constituted deviations by a lone jury or juror, our history
shows that racial bias is not a rare isolated occurrence and must be addressed to promote the
value of equal protection of the law promised by the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of the
Civil War. Additionally, the Court noted that racial bias is different in light of practical
considerations which render existing safeguards inadequate in protecting the right to trial by an
impartial jury such as the risk that specific voir dire questions regarding racial bias may worsen
any racial bias while being ineffective in revealing such bias and juror reluctance to report fellow
11
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jurors’ racially biased statements prior to the verdict. Finally, racial bias must be treated
differently than other types of bias due to the necessity of preserving the public confidence in
jury verdicts which is essential to the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no impeachment
rule when a juror’s statement clearly reveals reliance on racial bias or racial stereotypes as a
basis for the juror’s vote of guilty. The Court cautioned that not every casual comment
exhibiting racial bias warrants a constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule. However,
when a juror’s statement evidences racial bias significantly motivated the juror’s vote of guilty,
the trial court must be allowed to consider evidence of the juror’s statement in order to uphold
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by an impartial jury. The Court left open the
issues of what procedures a trial court should use when a defendant files a motion for new trial
on the basis of juror testimony regarding a fellow juror’s racial bias and what standard a trial
court should use when assessing whether evidence of racial bias is sufficient to warrant a new
trial.
Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, arguing that
the Court’s decision will undermine the no impeachment rule’s ability to promote open
discussions during jury deliberations, protect jurors from harassment by the losing party, and
preserve the finality of verdicts. Justice Alito criticized the majority opinion’s declaration that
racial bias is different than other forms of partiality as having no basis in the text and history of
the Sixth Amendment and its assessment of the ineffectiveness of the usual safeguards, including
voir dire and pre-verdict juror reports of fellow jurors’ inappropriate statements, as unconvincing
and overstepping into an area of legislative purview. Justice Alito warned that by breaching the
confidentiality of jury deliberations with this exception to the no impeachment rule, the Court
12
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has embarked on a slippery slope since there is no principled way to draw a distinction between
racial bias and other forms of partiality. Given the likelihood of further expansions of this
breach of confidentiality, the creation of this constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule
may well undermine the right to trial by jury, a right which relies on the ability of laypeople to
speak and make decisions in the way they do in their daily affairs without being subject to public
scrutiny.
Justice Thomas also dissented, arguing that the Court’s holding is not supported by the
original understanding of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Amendment right to
trial by impartial jury merely protects the common law right to trial by jury in existence at the
time the Sixth Amendment took effect. Because there was no clearly established common law
right to impeach a jury verdict with juror testimony regarding juror misconduct at the time of the
ratifications of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth Amendment cannot serve as a
basis for disregarding a state’s statutory no impeachment rule. Justice Thomas stated that the
issue of whether to modify or eliminate the no impeachment rule is a matter for the states to
decide through their legislative processes and criticized the Court for overstepping by imposing
an exception to the no impeachment rule which is not constitutionally required.
Methods
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court noted that while all of the states have
some version of the no impeachment rule and most states follow the federal rule, there is
substantial variation in the approaches states take with regard to the exceptions to the rule.
However, there is very little research as to specifically how states vary in regards to exceptions
to this rule in criminal trials. Furthermore, a vast majority of this research is legal or descriptive

13

STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT
in nature and is not an empirical assessment of: whether states offer exceptions to the no
impeachment rule, under which circumstances exceptions are allowed, how many exceptions do
states tend to allow in statute, and whether states have amended or updated their respective
statutes over time. Also, if no statute exists or there are no statutory exceptions, does state case
law provide for comparable exceptions to this rule? The present study seeks to fill these voids in
the extant research.
The present study is concerned with two primary research questions: whether state juror
impeachment statutes vary in regards to the exceptions allowed to the no impeachment rule in
criminal cases, and whether the existence and number of state statutory exceptions to the no
impeachment rule varies according to how recently states have amended their respective juror
impeachment statutes.
This study obtained its data via the Westlaw legal search engine. Initial searches focused
on whether states had statutory provisions for juror impeachment in criminal cases only. For the
purposes of this study, the United States (Federal Rules of Evidence) was included, and
hereinafter constitutes a ‘state’ in the analyses and discussion below. This allows for more
uniformity of comparison as many states have already adopted the language of the federal rule in
part or in whole. If states did have statutory provision(s) on when juror impeachment was
allowed, the various reasons were subsequently coded. Based on a review of the literature and
juror impeachment laws, the overwhelming legal reasons for juror impeachment were whether a
member of the jury had been influenced by extraneous prejudicial information, improper outside
influences, or whether a mistake was made on a verdict form. Nonetheless, other legally
prescribed exceptions to the no impeachment rule were collected as well. Arizona had two such
laws- one within the rules of evidence (Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 606), and one within
14
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criminal procedure (16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 24.1). The former only applies to civil
law, and the later uses slightly different language and does not include the same exceptions to the
no impeachment rule as the former. For the purposes of the study, only the one pertaining to
criminal cases will be examined, however both are included in Appendix A.
If a state did not have a law specifically related to or containing language on juror
impeachment, the closest comparable statute was located (i.e. juror’s ability to testify, duty of
jurors, new trials, etc.) and the respective state was coded as not allowing juror impeachment by
law. If a statute did not allow for exceptions for juror impeachment to occur by law in criminal
trials, these states were coded as not allowing juror impeachment by law.4 For example,
Connecticut’s Practice Book 1998 (Sec. 16-34) stated that juror impeachment is allowed, but
only in civil cases. However, this does not concern criminal cases. Thus, Connecticut was coded
as having no statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule. However, for states not allowing
some statutory exception to the rule, a review was conducted of Westlaw’s ‘Relevant Additional
Resources’ and ‘Notes of Decisions’ sections for each respective statute pertaining to juror's
competency as a witness, or the statute most similar to this. This review allowed for the
examination of whether a state’s case law, absent established legal exceptions to the no
impeachment rule, provided for such exceptions.5 All statutes examined and coded are available
in Appendix A, which records when the statute was enacted or last amended and where
specifically within established law the statute was found. Almost all of the statutes examined
originated within that state’s rules of evidence or criminal procedure. Also, New York did not
have a comparable statute to collect, but it was discovered that case law allowed for such an
exception to occur; so it was coded accordingly.
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We also examined the differences between states who amended their statutes relating to
juror impeachment before and after 2010. This range was used because of the states for which
we have data as to when the statute examined in this study was last amended or enacted (if never
altered) (n=44), more than half (n=23) were amended or enacted between 2010 and 2018. We
used 2010 as a cutoff since more than half of all statutes were enacted or amended during the
decade of 2010s. While this pattern is beyond the scope of this study, it could be reasoned that
since most state’s juror impeachment statutes are modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606, and that rule was last amended in 2011, many states have since updated their
respective statutes accordingly.
Nonetheless, this measure includes states that do not allow juror impeachment as well,
per their respective law or rule. There were seven total states for which no information could be
gathered as to when their respective statute or rule was enacted or last amended. Thus, while we
present basic descriptives of whether or not a state has a statutory exception to the no
impeachment rule and when it was last enacted or amended (see Table 4), we collapsed the year
measure so as to avoid low cell counts in our basic analyses. Overall, of the 44 states for which
we have data regarding when the relevant statute was last amended or enacted, 32 states have at
least one statutory exception to the no impeachment rule, whereas eight states had applicable
statutes, but did not provide statutory exceptions and instead allowed exceptions only in case
law. Furthermore, four states have no exception to the rule at all – either in statute or in case law.
The latter two categories were coded as ‘0’ in the proceeding analyses.6
The first analysis examines whether or not states that amended their respective statutes
from 2010 to present vary in terms of the number of legally prescribed exceptions (e.g.
exceptions defined in statute) to the no impeachment rule from those who last amended their law
16
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before 2010. To test if these differences are significant, we employ the Mann-Whitney U test to
examine whether the number of exceptions varies by whether a state amended or updated their
respective statute before or after 2010. Put simply, the test examines whether two groups of data
are different by ranking the data of each group and then the ranks of each group are compared.
This test is used for a number of reasons. First, the assumption of normality for an independent ttest was not met. Second, the Mann-Whitney U test is a form of nonparametric null hypothesis
testing that does not require an assumption of normality. Lastly, this test is the nonparametric
equivalent to the independent t-test (Brace et al., 2013). For this test, however, we are only
examining states that have a statute that expressly defines what exceptions exist to the no
impeachment rule. Adding in the remaining states would bias our results as those states would
inevitably have ‘0’ statutorily defined exceptions to the rule.
The second analysis uses a chi-square test to examine whether significant differences
exist between states with and without statutorily defined exceptions to the aforementioned rule in
terms of when the state last amended its respective law. This analysis is important because it
examines whether states that have recently amended their respective juror impeachment statutes
are providing exceptions to the no impeachment rule. Put another way, this is important to
examine because it signals as to whether states are amending or have recently amended statutes
to limit or allow the admission of impeachment evidence. For this, we examine whether or not a
state has a statutorily prescribed exception(s), whether a state’s case law provides such
exceptions when none exists in statute, or whether a state does not have such an exception in
either statute or case law , and whether these realities vary over the two aforementioned time
periods. Similar to the previously mentioned analysis, we combine states without any statutorily
defined exceptions to the rule with states whose only exceptions are rooted in case law (i.e.
17
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coded as ‘0’).7 This group constitutes states that do not have a statutorily defined exception to
the no impeachment rule. This point will be discussed later, but the collapsing of these
categories serves to also avoid low cell counts that would result from keeping three groups
within the dependent variable (e.g. state status on exception to the no impeachment rule).
Overall, we anticipate that states that have amended their respective statutes more
recently will have more exceptions to the no impeachment rule and will also be more likely to
provide exceptions to the rule in their statute.
Results
Analyses revealed that 37 states provided some form of statutory exception to the no
impeachment rule, whereas 10 only provided such exceptions via case law. Furthermore, four
states overall had no exceptions in either established law or case law (see Table 1).
Almost all of the states that did provide a statutory exception to the no impeachment rule
allowed for extraneous prejudicial information (n=35) or improper outside influences (n=36) to
serve as legally valid reasons for jurors to impeach the verdict. In fact, 15 states allowed for a
mistake on the verdict form to serve as a viable exception to the rule too. These were the three
most common exceptions noted during data collection and coding, and serve as the primary
exceptions to the no impeachment rule across states. Furthermore, these are the three exceptions
outlined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606 (see Miller, 2012 for review of these
exceptions).

----Insert Table 1 approx. here----
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Other notable exceptions to the no impeachment rule that were statutorily authorized
included whether: a juror gave false testimony during voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias
(Minnesota), a juror used drugs or alcohol (Indiana), the verdict occurred by determination of
chance (Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee), during the trial a juror made one or more
statements exhibiting overt racial/national origin bias (Virginia), or whether any juror discussed
matters pertaining to the trial with persons other than fellow jurors (Vermont). Table 2 includes
more examples of legal exceptions to the aforementioned rule.

----Insert Table 2 approx. here----

Some states either did not have a law pertaining to juror impeachment or did not allow
any legal exceptions to the rule of no impeachment. In total, ten states did not have a statutory
exception to the no impeachment rule, but still provide for juror impeachment via case law,
whereas four states had neither. In total, including the Federal Rules of Evidence, 47 of 51
jurisdictions provide some form of juror impeachment to occur via statutory authority or case
law. Table 3 provides a detailed description of the exceptions found in state case law for states
that did not have a law on the books allowing for juror impeachment.
Many of the case law exceptions for states either lacking statutory provisions for juror
impeachment or having no comparable laws were similar to the legal exceptions described
above. For example, many exceptions rooted in case law were related to misconduct by jury
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members during the trial, the influence of outside influences, extraneous prejudicial information,
or a juror concealing or demonstrating bias or prejudice. These were all noted legal exceptions
to the no impeachment rule too.

----Insert Table 3 approx. here---Based on when these statutes were last amended or altered (see Appendix A), more than
half of all states that provide for a statutory exception to the no impeachment rule have amended
or updated their respective statutes in the 2010s. The history of seven states statutes were not
located, however. Nonetheless, since 2000, 24 of 32 states for which there is available data and
provide statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, have altered or amended their laws
pertaining to juror impeachment. Seven of the eight states for which no statutorily authorized
exception exists, but case law does, were last amended or altered prior to the 1990s.
Furthermore, of the 15 states that allow for the mistake on the verdict form exception in statute,
all have amended their statutes in the last eleven years. No statutes were found to have been last
amended prior to 1960. Thus, states have been updating their no impeachment statutes quite
recently.

----Insert Table 4 approx. here---For example, Arizona, Maryland, and Virginia have all amended their respective statutes
concerning the competency of a juror as a witness in criminal cases in the past year. However,
only Virginia will allow for each of the three aforementioned legal exceptions to the no
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impeachment rule, as well as for racial/ethnic bias, whereas Arizona allows for six different
forms of juror misconduct (see Table 2). Arizona seemingly allows for the two most common
exceptions –extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside influences- but due to the
differences in language used within the statute (see Table 2), the interpretation of said exceptions
may not be identical. Prior to the amending of the statute, Virginia only recognized extraneous
prejudicial information and improper outside influences as statutorily recognized exceptions.
Now, Virginia allows for the three most common forms of exceptions (see Table 1) as well as
“[w]hether during the trial a juror made one or more statements exhibiting overt racial/national
origin bias” (Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 2:606). On the other hand, despite recently updating its rule
relating to juror impeachment, Maryland remains as one of only three states that has neither an
established exception to the no impeachment rule in case law or in state statute. Thus, the
contemporary alterations that have occurred to the no impeachment rule are not uniform. In
looking at how changes have occurred to statutes concerning a juror’s competency to serve as a
witness, it is equally important to note the extent to which existing statutes provide exceptions to
the no impeachment rule. States that have such statutes encompass between two to six (Arizona)
legally defined exceptions to the no impeachment rule (see Table 5). Nonetheless, in comparing
the results displayed in Tables 4 and 5, it is evident that the majority of states that have the most
statutorily defined exceptions are those that were more recently amended.

----Insert Table 5 approx. here----
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To discern whether or not states that amended their respective statutes from 2010 to
present vary in terms of the number of legally prescribed exceptions to the no impeachment rule
from those who last amended their law before 2010, we employ the Mann-Whitney U test. The
test revealed a statistically significant difference between states that amended their statutes
before or after 2010 in terms of the number of exceptions included in those statutes (U=58.00,
Z=-2.595, p=.015, two-tailed). Thus, states that altered their statutes more recently had more
exceptions (i.e. a higher median of exceptions) as compared to states that last amended their
statutes prior to 2010.
----Insert Table 6 approx. here----

To test the relationship between states having a statutory exception or not and when the
statute was last amended, we will utilize the chi-square test. The analysis demonstrates that the
relationship between the tendency of states to adopt statutory exceptions and when those statutes
were last amended was significant χ2(1, N=44) =4.919, p=.027. This relationship was moderate
Φ= .334, with the era in which the statute was last amended explaining 11.2% of the variance in
whether a state provided a statutorily defined exception to the no impeachment rule.
----Insert Table 7 approx. here----

Discussion
This study empirically assesses the variation in states’ statutory exceptions to the no
impeachment rule in criminal cases. It also examines whether the existence and number of these
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statutory exceptions vary according to how recently states’ juror impeachment statutes were
amended. States have taken a variety of approaches to carving out exceptions to the no
impeachment rule. Exceptions for extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside
influences predominate in state statutes. Another fairly common statutory exception allows juror
impeachment to establish a clerical error in entry of the verdict on the verdict form. While less
common, there are other notable statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule such as states
which allow exceptions for establishing that a juror lied in voir dire to hide bias, juror substance
use, chance verdicts, and juror discussion of the case with nonjurors. State case law has
established similar notable exceptions to the no impeachment rule in some states for extraneous
prejudicial information, improper outside influence, juror misconduct, chance verdicts, and juror
misrepresentations during voir dire.
There is a relationship between recency of legislative action and the existence and
number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule. Our study found significant
relationships across these two dimensions. States which have amended their juror impeachment
statutes more recently were more likely to provide statutory exceptions to the no impeachment
rule, and such states also have a greater number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment
rule, on average. This does not necessarily indicate, however, that all prior versions of the now
amended statute had less exceptions on average, as this type of longitudinal analysis is beyond
the scope of this study. However, it is worth noting that statutes that have been more recently
updated tend to have more exceptions to the rule on average; thus signifying that recent
alterations may be further enunciating either what case law has determined and needs to be set
forth in statute or that the trends are a natural evolution of the no impeachment rule in criminal
trials.
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Our examination of variation in states’ statutory exception to the no impeachment rule
has identified some notable exceptions provided by some states’ statutes which state legislatures
may want to consider adopting when amending their statutory no impeachment rules. In states
which do not have statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule but do have case law
authorizing exceptions to the no impeachment rule, state legislatures should consider amending
existing statutes to include the exceptions currently authorized by case law. Having each state’s
exceptions allowing for juror impeachment in a single location, a juror impeachment statute,
would improve transparency to the populace and thus enhance accountability by providing a
clear, concise, more readily accessible statement of the no impeachment rule and its exceptions
in each state.
Focusing on the number of legally prescribed exceptions is important because states
ranged from 0 (four states) to 6 (Arizona) in the number of exceptions enumerated in statute, and
the number of exceptions allowed may reflect the impetus behind recent amendments to prior
statutes due to various procedural issues state courts have faced over time. Furthermore, the
number of exceptions allowed in statute exemplifies how states vary in how they approach the
issue of juror impeachment in criminal trials; with the more exceptions allowed reflecting a
state’s willingness to permit the setting aside of the verdict if some issue may have prejudiced or
negatively impacted the formation of the verdict. Put simply, the number of exceptions may
reflect a state’s attitude, albeit indirectly, towards the due process rights of defendants and the
need for courts to root out substantial bias or juror misconduct in criminal trials.
Some states provide, either via statute or case law, for an exception to the no
impeachment rule for juror statements indicating bias based on race, national origin, ethnicity, or
religion. In the wake of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), regardless of whether a
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jurisdiction’s statute or case law provides for such an exception, all jurisdictions within the
United States must allow post-verdict juror testimony regarding a juror’s clear statement during
deliberations evidencing racial bias as a significant motivator of the juror’s vote of guilty. Note
that this constitutional exception also includes bias based on ethnicity, as the Court used the term
racial bias to encompass bias based on both race and ethnicity (given that the facts of PenaRodriguez actually involved the use of stereotypes based on ethnicity). This exception to the no
impeachment rule is constitutionally mandated by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
trial by an impartial jury (Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,2017).
As state and federal courts implement this new constitutional exception to the no
impeachment rule, courts will grapple with a number of issues. Courts will need to establish
what procedures to use when a defendant files a motion for new trial on the basis of juror
testimony regarding a fellow juror’s racial bias. Courts will also need to determine what
standard a trial court should use when assessing whether evidence of racial bias is sufficient to
warrant a new trial. Because Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) left these issues as open
questions, there is likely to be substantial variation in the approaches taken by courts in different
jurisdictions and this may eventually result in a circuit split, which could prompt another U.S.
Supreme Court decision to resolve these issues in favor of establishing a uniform procedure and
standard. The findings of this study may provide a baseline through which courts and legal
scholars can better understand the variance that exists between states regarding the use of the no
impeachment rule in criminal trials, in their efforts to make a more uniform procedural standard.
Courts may see an increase in constitutional challenges to state and federal no
impeachment rules as litigants seek to expand the Pena-Rodriguez exception to allow jurors to
impeach their verdicts through juror testimony regarding fellow jurors’ other biases. Justice
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Alito’s warning regarding the slippery slope will likely prove prophetic, as it seems likely that
courts may eventually extend the logic of Pena-Rodriguez to create other constitutional
exceptions to the no impeachment rule for other biases, such as those based on religion, gender,
and sexual orientation. As Alito noted, it is difficult to discern how barring juror testimony
regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement evidencing racial bias as a significant motivator of the
juror’s vote violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by an impartial jury, but
barring juror testimony regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement evidencing bias based on
religion, gender, or sexual orientation as a significant motivator of the juror’s vote does not.
However, Alito’s dubious prediction that an expanding constitutional exception to the no
impeachment rule will undermine the right to trial by jury is unlikely to prove true. States
already permit a variety of exceptions to the no impeachment rule and yet the jury trial is still
alive and well. However, this study has provided insight as to the balance that exists across states
between the right to due process and the need for jury secrecy; with some states leaning more
towards one end of this balance than others.
Finally, we may see state legislatures take action to amend state statutes to codify the
Pena-Rodriguez exception. Some state legislatures may also take the initiative to add a broader
statutory exception to the no impeachment rule for juror statements indicating other odious
biases, such as those based on religion, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation. The extent
to which Pena-Rodriguez motivates state legislatures to amend state juror impeachment statutes
remains to be seen, of course. Future research assessing developments in both legislation and
case law in the years following Pena-Rodriguez may be warranted.
This study is not without its limitations, however. One is that the data are cross-sectional,
in that we only examined the most current or updated requisite statute and not lexiconical
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changes over time. The latter would provide more support for the results of this study, however,
at the outset of the study, was beyond the scope of our initial research questions. Another
limitation is that while statutes provide explicit direction for criminal courts to adhere to, in that
they are codified and can be more readily drawn on by courts, this study was unable to capture
all case law exceptions that states have. For example, it is unclear as to whether these respective
statutes have evolved as a result of case law, or were created due to shifting jurisprudence.
Furthermore, do states – that have an applicable no impeachment statute - have the same
exceptions enumerated in their statutes as well as state case law? This question was beyond the
scope of this study as well, but such an analysis could lend credence to the assertion that states
should codify existing exceptions as they evolve to increase transparency, and reduce confusion
in the court room. Lastly, the analytic strategy of this study did not capture other theoretical or
contextually related factors that may explain: the presence of a statutory exception, the number
of statutory exceptions, or any such change to the respective statute. Future studies should build
on our study to address both the limitations of our study and the areas in which our initial
research questions can be further examined.
Conclusion
We have a long-held tradition of courts refusing to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony to
impeach their own verdict, owing to the view that close examination of jurors’ shortcomings
would only serve to undermine public confidence in the jury system (Tanner v. United States,
1987; West, 2011). However, in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court decided that
courts turning a deaf ear to jurors’ reports of their fellow jurors’ reliance on racial bias in casting
their vote of guilty in a criminal trial is a far greater threat to public trust in our justice system
than carving out a limited constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule. This marks an
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important turning point in our jurisprudence, with the U.S. Supreme Court drawing a line in the
sand to protect fundamental principles of justice.
This research can inform criminal justice policy development in the area of state statutory
no impeachment rule exceptions. After Pena-Rodriguez, many state legislatures may amend
state no impeachment statutes to codify the constitutional exception created by the Court. As
state legislators undertake this task, this would be a good time to also take stock of what other
exceptions should be added to states’ no impeachment statutes. The present study provides base
line data on the current state of states’ statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule. By
identifying variations in state statutory exceptions, this research highlights the most common
exceptions as well as notable less common exceptions. State legislatures can use this data to
assess whether their state no impeachment statutes have the most common exceptions and this
may facilitate reflection in states not having the common exceptions on the desirability of adding
such exceptions. For example, states which do not have the exception for mistake on the verdict
form may want to consider adding this exception.
The notable less common exceptions identified in this study may also give state
legislators food for thought as they consider whether their state no impeachment statutes strike
the appropriate balance between the interests in protecting due process and preserving secrecy of
jury deliberations. For instance, in states which do not have such exceptions, it would seem
prudent to consider adding the exceptions for determining verdicts by chance and juror
intoxication, as it seems hard to justify turning a blind eye to such mischief. Furthermore, only
Virginia had a statutory exception for racial bias; as this statute was amended following the Pena
ruling. The Court ruled that racial bias constituted a violation of one’s Sixth Amendment rights
to an impartial jury trial; thus requiring that racial bias serve as an exception to the no
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impeachment rule. However, only Virginia has explicitly codified this new exception to the no
impeachment rule, and it remains to be seen as to whether other states will follow suit. Since it
is not clear that ‘racial bias’ could fall under the ‘extraneanous prejudicial information’ category
(or another category that we examined), states should pursue the codification of this exception so
as to clarify existing procedure pertaining to juror’s competency to impeach the verdict.
State legislatures can take further steps to shore up public trust in our system of trial by
jury by amending state no impeachment statutes to add additional exceptions which allow judges
to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony regarding certain overt acts which make a mockery of the
idea that juries serve an important function as a check against government power. At a
minimum, ensuring each state’s no impeachment statute has exceptions for clerical error in entry
of the verdict on the verdict form, juror alcohol and drug use during trial, chance verdicts, and
intra-jury violence and bribes would be prudent. State legislatures can also move us closer to our
aspired ideal of trial by an impartial jury by adding statutory exceptions for juror bias, whether
that bias be based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or
gender identity. While attempting to perfect the jury may be a fool’s errand, we can certainly
enact policies which move us closer to the noble ideal embodied in the Sixth Amendment.
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court made a clear statement that racial bias
is different. Unlike other imperfections in jury deliberations, the courts can no longer take a
“hear no evil” approach when a juror offers post-verdict testimony that a fellow juror made
racially biased statements during jury deliberations which indicate the fellow juror’s reliance on
racial bias in voting upon the defendant’s fate. The time is ripe for state legislatures to weigh in
with amendments to their states’ no impeachment statutes to provide a broader statutory
exception to the no impeachment rule for juror testimony regarding fellow jurors’ statements
29

STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT
during jury deliberations indicating bias against other protected classes motivated a vote to
convict. Justice can only be blind when courts are free to listen to evidence of improper bias
infecting jury deliberations, regardless of whether that evidence comes from a juror after a
verdict has been rendered.

Endnotes
1

While the term impeachment is commonly heard in reference to charging a government official

with misconduct to effect removal from office or undermining the credibility of a witness’s
testimony, this term is also used in criminal procedure in reference to the use of juror testimony
to attack the validity of the jury’s verdict.
2

A circuit split occurs when the different circuit courts of appeals within the federal court system

decide precedents which establish differing rules of law on a particular issue. One of the factors
the U.S. Supreme Court considers when deciding whether to hear an appeal (grant certiorari) is
the presence of a circuit split on an important issue of law, as resolution of the legal issue by the
U.S. Supreme Court promotes uniformity of law among jurisdictions.
3

While Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) involved a juror’s reliance on ethnic bias and

stereotypes, the U.S. Supreme Court conflates ethnic and racial bias by using the term racial bias
throughout the Court’s majority opinion and focusing on the United States’ history of racial
discrimination. Given the Court’s treatment of ethnic bias and racial bias as interchangeable
terms, the Court’s holding logically applies to both racial bias and ethnic bias.
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4

Since the focus of this study is state statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, references

to allowing juror impeachment “by law” refer to statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule
(in contrast to exceptions to the no impeachment rule created by case law).
5

The focus of this article is state statutes governing juror impeachment. Accordingly, an

exhaustive survey of state case law on juror impeachment is beyond the scope of this article. For
states having no statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, a review of Westlaw’s
‘Relevant Additional Resources’ and ‘Notes of Decisions’ sections for each respective statute
pertaining to juror's competency as a witness or the statute most similar to this provides
information on typical exceptions provided by state case law for states without statutory
exceptions to the no impeachment rule. See Table 3.
6

Thus, if a state has a statute dealing with the impeachment of a verdict by a juror, we examined

whether that statute provided any such exception to the rule. Thirty-two states provided explicit
exceptions to the no impeachment rule in their statute. If the applicable statute did not have any
exceptions, we then turned to Westlaw (see Methods) to determine if case law exceptions
existed. This was conducted in a simple ‘yes/no’ fashion, with a basic recording of the more
readily available case law exceptions, as we did not conduct an extensively deep examination of
case law as we examined 51 jurisdictions in this study. If a state did not allow for a case law
exception either, then they were recorded as having no exception to the rule (i.e. 4 states).
7

Again the focus of the analysis is on the extent to which these exceptions are provided in state

statutes. While we recorded a simple ‘yes/no’ response as to whether case law exceptions existed
in the absence of a statutorily authorized exception (along with some of the categories of
exceptions we found, if available via a basic overview of state case law), we did not record every
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exception that existed in state case law as such an examination would be beyond the scope of this
study and would require a deep analysis of state case law, which was not needed to conduct this
study. However, some exceptions were noted, if found during the course of our examination into
whether a state’s case law provided recourse. Nonetheless, since these analyses are focused on
the presence and robustness of state statutory exceptions over the two time periods, recording all
states without explicit statutory exceptions to the rule as ‘0’ allows for more specific examination
of exceptions to the rule in statute across states and whether they have been amended recently. It
would not make logical sense to include case law exceptions in the same category as statutory
exceptions in our models since we do not want to conflate the two sources and case law
exceptions can lead to statutory exceptions. Thus, when we are examining whether a state has
updated or amended their respective ‘no impeachment rule’ recently, we are also looking at
whether they have added an exception in statute. While this article cannot examine longitudinal
shifts in state statutes, we can examine whether a state has recently updated their respective
statute and whether that version contains any exceptions. We are essentially looking as to
whether a pattern exists between states that have recently amended their respective statute and
whether statutory exceptions exist. For example, Maryland updated their statute in 2018 but did
not provide any exception to the rule. This demonstrates an unwillingness to recognize any
exceptions to the rule via statute.
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Tables
Table 1
Juror Impeachment Laws by State (N=51)
Juror
Impeachment
Allowed?

Extraneous
Prejudicial Info

Improper
Outside
Influences

Alabama

Yes

x

x

Alaska

Yes

x

x

Arizona

Yes

Arkansas

Yes

x

x

California

No*

Colorado

Yes

x

x

x

Connecticut

No

Delaware

Yes

x

x

x

Florida

No*

Georgia

Yes

x

x

x

Hawaii

No

Idaho

Yes

x

x

Illinois

Yes

x

x

x

Indiana

Yes

x

x

x

Iowa

Yes

x

x

x

Kansas

No*

Kentucky

No*

Louisiana

Yes

x

x

Maine

Yes

x

x

Maryland

No

Massachusetts

Yes

x

x

Michigan

Yes

x

x

x

Minnesota

Yes

x

x

x

State
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Mississippi

Yes

x

x

Missouri

No*

Montana

Yes

x

x

Nebraska

Yes

x

x

Nevada

No*

New Hampshire

No*

New Jersey

No*

New Mexico

Yes

x

x

New York

No*

North Carolina

Yes

x

x

North Dakota

Yes

x

x

Ohio

Yes

x

x

Oklahoma

Yes

x

x

Oregon

No*

Pennsylvania

Yes

x

x

Rhode Island

Yes

x

x

South Carolina

Yes

x

x

South Dakota

Yes

x

x

Tennessee

Yes

x

x

Texas

Yes

Utah

Yes

x

x

Vermont

Yes

x

x

x

Virginia

Yes

x

x

x

Washington

No

West Virginia

Yes

x

x

x

Wisconsin

Yes

x

x

Wyoming

Yes

x

x

US

Yes

x

x

x

x

x

x
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Totals

35

Statutory Exception

37

Case Law Exception

10

36

15

No Exception
4
Note. “Juror Impeachment Allowed” column records whether a state has a statutory exception to
the no impeachment rule. States which have no statutory exception, but have established
exceptions to the no impeachment rule in case law are denoted with an asterisk next to “No”
(e.g., “No*”).
*State allows for juror impeachment via established case law, despite having no statutory
provisions for juror impeachment.
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Table 2
Other Statutory Exceptions for Juror Impeachment
State
Arizona

Other Exceptions
Receiving evidence not admitted during the trial or phase of trial;
Deciding the verdict by lot; Perjuring himself or herself, or
willfully failing to respond fully to a direct question posed during
the voir dire examination; Receiving a bribe or pledging his or
her vote in any other way; Being intoxicated during trial
proceedings or deliberations; Conversing before the verdict with
any interested party about the outcome of the case;

Indiana

Drug or Alcohol use

Minnesota

Threats of violence or violent acts; whether juror gave
false answers on voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias

Montana

Assention to verdict by determination of chance

North Dakota

Verdict arrived at by chance

Ohio

Concerning any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe,
or any improprieties of any officer of the court

Tennessee

Verdict arrived at by chance

Texas

To rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to serve

Vermont

Whether any juror discussed matters pertaining to the trial with
persons other than fellow jurors

Virginia

Whether during the trial a juror made one or more statements
exhibiting overt racial/national origin bias
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Table 3
States without Statutory Provisions for Juror Impeachment

Juror
Impeachment
Allowed in Lawa
No

Juror
Impeachment
Allowed by Case
Law
Yes

Connecticut

No

No

Florida

No

Yes

Hawaii

No

No

Kansas

No

Yes

Under civil procedure but applies to
criminal cases per K.S.A. 60-402;
allows for exception via case law if
verdict arrived at by chance;
disregarding jury instructions or
responsibilities of being a juror

Kentucky

No

Yes

Case law allows for exceptions

Maryland

No

No

Missouri

No

Yes

State
California
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Exceptions
No explanation of what is and is not
included in terms of juror
impeachment, but most of the law
regarding juror impeachment comes
in the form of case law over time.

Case law allows for exception due to
overt acts that may have prejudiced
the jury in reaching their verdict

Rooted in case law; Can grant a new
trial pursuant to V.A.M.S. 547.020
for jury misconduct or when verdict
has been decided by means other than
a fair expression of opinion on the
part of all the jurors; Overt
independent acts of misconduct
outside of courtroom; statements

STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT
reflecting ethnic or religious bias or
prejudice
Nevada

No

Yes

Case law allows for testimony about
an objective fact concerning juror
misconduct; very vague

New Hampshire

No

Yes

Case law: from the language, it
appears that the Court's inquiry of the
jury may elicit testimony concerning
“any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon his or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing him
to assent or to dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection
therewith ...”

New Jersey

No

Yes

Case law allows for exception due to
outside influences

New York

No

Yes

If mistake occurs; prejudicial conduct
occurring outside of jury room;
general misconduct

Oregon

No

Yes

Case law allows for exception due to
misconduct that amounts to fraud,
bribery, forcible coercion or any
other obstruction of justice that
would subject the offender to a
criminal prosecution therefore

Washington

No

No

Note. Includes state case law providing exceptions to the no impeachment rule only for states
which do not have a juror impeachment statute or do not have statutory exceptions allowing juror
impeachment to occur.
a
Juror impeachment exceptions provided by statute.
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Table 4
Changes to Juror Impeachment Laws by Decade (n=44)
Case Law
No
Statutory
Exception
Decade
Exception
Exception
Total
1960
2
0
0
2
1970
1
0
2
3
1980
1
1
3
5
1990
3
1
3
7
2000
0
0
4
4
2010
1
2
20
23
8
Total
4
32
44
Note. Number of states last amending or enacting the relevant statute in each decade. Does not
include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted or amended was
available.
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Table 5
Number of Statutory Exceptions to the Rule by State
Total
0

States
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington

2

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming

3

Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, US

4

Indiana, North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia

5
Minnesota
6
Arizona
Note. Number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule. States having no statute (e.g.,
New York) or having a statute but no statutory exceptions are included in the “0” row.
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Table 6
Mann Whitney U Test of # of State Statutory Exceptions to the No Impeachment Rule (n=32)

N
Median

Before 2010 2010-Present
12
20
2
3

Mann-Whitney U
58
Z
-2.595
p
0.015
Note. Includes only states having at least one statutory exception to the no impeachment rule.
Does not include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted or
amended was available.
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Table 7
Chi-Square Test of State Statutory Exceptions to the No Impeachment Rule (n=44)
Statute Amended
Before 2010

2010-Present

χ2

p

Total (%)

Exceptions
Yes
12
20
4.919 0.027
72.7
Note. Does not include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted
or amended was available.
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Appendix A
State
Alabama

Citation
ARE Rule 606

Enacted/Amended
Chapter/Title
N/A
Witnesses

Alaska Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606
Arizona Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606
16A A.R.S. Rules
Crim.Proc., Rule 24.1
A.R.E. Rule 606

1994

N/A

Witnesses

California

West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code
§ 1150

1967

Evidence Affected
or Excluded by
Extrinsic Policies

Colorado

CRE Rule 606

2007

Witnesses

C.G.S.A. § 51-245

2012

Courts

D.R.E., Rule 606

2014

Witnesses

Florida

West's F.S.A. § 90.607

1995

Evidence Code

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann., § 24-6-606 2013

Hawaii

HRS § 626-1, Rule 606

Alaska
Arizona

Arkansas

Connecticut
Delaware

WitnessesImpeachment
Witnesses

2012

Article/Title
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness

2018

Witnesses
Generally
Witnesses

1984

1

Competency of juror as
witness
Other Evidence
Affected or Excluded
by Extrinsic Policies
Competency of juror as
witness
Jurors
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of certain
persons as witnesses
General ProvisionsJuror as Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
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State
Idaho

Amended
1985

Chapter/Title
Witnesses

Illinois

Citation
Idaho Rules of Evidence
(I.R.E.), Rule 606
Evid. Rule 606

2011

Witnesses

Indiana

Rules of Evid., Rule 606

2014

Witnesses

I.C.A. Rule 5.606

2017

Witnesses

K.S.A. 60-441; 444

1963

Extrinsic Policies
Affecting
Admissibility

Kentucky

KRE Rule 606

1992

Witnesses

Louisiana

LSA-C.E. Art. 606

1989

Witnesses

Maine Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606
MD Rules, Rule 5-606

2015

Witnesses

2018

Witnesses

MA Guide to Evidence
Section 606
MI Rules MRE 606

N/A

Witnesses

2012

50 M.S.A., Rules of Evid.,
Rule 606
M.R.E. Rule 606

2016

Competency of
juror as witness
Witnesses

2016

Witnesses

Iowa
Kansas

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

2

Article/Title
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Evidence to test a
verdict or indictment
Competency of juror as
witness
Disqualification of
juror as witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness

Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
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State
Missouri

Citation
Courtroom Handbook On
Mo. Evid. § 606.2 (2017
ed.)

Montana

Montana Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606
Neb.Rev.St. § 27-606

1990

Witnesses

1975

Witnesses

N.R.S. 50.065

1971

Witnesses

2017

Witnesses

New Jersey

New Hampshire Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606
NJ R. Evid. N.J.R.E. 606

1993

Witnesses

New Mexico

NMRA, Rule 11-606

2012

Witnesses

N/A
Rules of Evid., G.S. § 8C1, Rule 606
Rule 606, N.D.R.Ev.

N/A
1983

Witnesses

2014

Witnesses

Evid. R. Rule 606

2007

Witnesses

12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2606

2002

Witnesses

O.R.S. § 40.335

1981

Witnesses

Nebraska
Nevada

New Hampshire

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

Oregon

Amended

Chapter/Title

Article/Title

N/A

3

Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
General ProvisionsCompetency: Juror as
Witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Restriction on juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
General ProvisionsCompetency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
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State
Pennsylvania

Citation
Pa.R.E., Rule 606

Amended
2013

Chapter/Title
Witnesses

Rhode Island

N/A

Witnesses

South Carolina

Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606
Rule 606, SCRE

1995

Witnesses

South Dakota

SDCL § 19-19-606

2016

Witnesses

Tennessee

Rules of Evid., Rule 606

2001

Witnesses

Texas

TX Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606
Utah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606
Vermont Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 2:606

2015

Witnesses

2011

Witnesses

2011

Witnesses

2018

Washington Rules of
Evidence, ER 606
West Virginia Rules of
Evidence (WVRE), Rule
606

1992

Witness
Examination
Witnesses

2014

Witnesses

Wisconsin

W.S.A. 906.06

N/A

Wyoming

Wyoming Rules of
Evidence, Rule 606

1978

Evidence-Witnesses Competency of juror as
witness
Witnesses
Competency of juror as
witness

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

4

Article/Title
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Competency of juror as
witness
Juror's Competency as
a Witness
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State
US

Citation
Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 606, 28 U.S.C.A.

Amended
2011

5

Chapter/Title
Witnesses

Article/Title
Juror's Competency as
a Witness

